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AFFECTIVE DISORDERS OF THE STATE: A SPINOZAN DIAGNOSIS 
AND CURE 
 
Ericka Tucker

 
 
Abstract: The problems of contemporary states are in large part “affective 
disorders”; they are failures of states to properly understand and coordinate the 
emotions of the individuals within and in some instances outside the state. By 
excluding, imprisoning, and marginalizing members of their societies, states create 
internal enemies who ultimately enervate their own power and the possibility of 
peace and freedom within the state. Spinoza’s political theory, based on the notion 
that the best forms of state are those that coordinate the power and emotions of 
those within a state, offers us both a diagnosis of and a cure for these affective 
disorders. In this paper I will outline Spinoza’s notion of the power of the state as a 
function of the power and coordination of the emotions of its citizens, and show 
that when the state contracts an affective disorder, such as excessive crime, 
rebellion, terrorism, etc. the state has failed to properly empower, include and 
coordinate the passions of the multitude of its citizens and subjects. 
 
CRIME, TERRORISM, riots, political factions, culture-clashes and religious 
extremism: the problems of contemporary states are destructive, but are they 
intractable? Can we understand these problems as caused by the same forces? In this 
paper, I will suggest that these problems can be understood as ‘affective’ or emotional 
disorders
1
 that emerge when governments fail to properly understand and coordinate 
the emotions of individuals within and in some instances outside the state. 
Developing my framework from Baruch Spinoza’s unique theory of political 
psychology, I will propose that by properly understanding the affective foundations of 
political life, we can diagnosis and cure these affective disorders.  
Despite his absence from the canon of Anglo-American political thought, 
Spinoza has much to offer contemporary political theory. In recent years, political 
theorists writing on the topics of toleration and freedom of expression have revived 
Spinoza’s writing on these issues.
2
 While Spinoza’s arguments for toleration and the 
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freedom to philosophize are powerful, they rest on his understanding of human 
psychology and specifically his theory of human emotions and their political 
importance. In this paper, by investigating the psychological and metaphysical 
foundation of Spinoza political theory, I hope to contribute to the literature on 
Spinoza’s usefulness for contemporary political thought.  
 
I.  Power, Passions, and Freedom in Spinozan Political Theory 
 
Spinoza built his theory of political philosophy, including his arguments for 
democracy, toleration, and freedom of expression on his theory of emotions and 
individual power. Spinoza takes humans to be primarily ‘affective’ or essentially 
emotional creatures. Spinoza argues that in order to build strong democratic states, we 
need to understand how to coordinate the emotions of a multitude of diverse 
passionate individuals. Spinoza's primary original contribution to political philosophy 
is the view that the power of the state is a function of the power and organization of 
the emotions or 'affects' of those within the state.
3
 
Problems of the state destroy public feelings of security and undermine the power 
of the government to provide such security to its citizens. The proposed ‘solutions’ to 
these problems are often worse than the problem themselves. Mass imprisonment, 
exclusion, increased citizen surveillance, police crackdowns and military 
interventions reduce the freedom of citizens and limit the possibilities of individual 
and collective flourishing. In Spinoza’s view these 'affective disorders' predictable 
and preventable. They can be prevented through empowering citizens and including 
those who may turn to crime and violence.  
Solutions to the state’s affective disorders that disempower the populace further 
by increasing their fear destabilize the state and diminish the possibility for peace and 
freedom in the state.
4
 When rulers fear their citizens, they react in ways that are both 
predictable and counterproductive. They imprison, they spy, they exclude, and they 
try to diminish the power of those whom they most fear. However, in Spinoza’s view, 
such measures serve only to increase the indignation of the people and further 
destabilize the state. The power of a state is not measured by how effectively a 
government can oppress its people. Rather, the power of a state is a function of the 
power of the citizens of that state.
5
 Disempower one’s citizens, and one is left with a 
weakened polity. The best state, in Spinoza's view, is one that need not fear the power 
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of its people. For Spinoza, no stable or free state can be based on antagonistic 
relations between rulers and ruled.
6
   
Living in a time of incredible political upheaval and diversity in culture and 
religion, with factional disputes spilling into bloody riots in the streets around his 
home, Spinoza came to see organizing the passions of the rulers and citizens as the 
basic problem of political philosophy. Unlike the neo-Aristotelians of his time, 
Spinoza did not think that human benevolence and natural sociability was a firm 
enough foundation for political security.
7
 Spinoza, following Hobbes, rejected 
Aristotle’s dictum: “It is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is 
by nature a political animal.”8 Spinoza granted that humans need one another and that 
we affect one another by our passions. This passionate interconnection, however, does 
not mean that a stable society is natural or that human sociability is a sufficient 
foundation for politics.
9
 
The same passions that bring people together and create the social world can 
destroy it. For Spinoza, every passion has two sides -- a constructive and destructive 
side. A group of individuals ruled by their passions has both a potential for 
democratic empowerment as well as a potential for chaos. The passions are volatile, 
and a multitude ruled by them cannot be trusted to achieve peace alone. Spinoza 
argues that to achieve peace within the state rulers needed to attend to the passions, or 
‘affects’ of their citizens.10  Spinoza understood the power and capacity for peace of 
the state as a function of the power and coordination of those individuals within its 
boundaries, which, following Hobbes, he called ‘the multitude’.11 For Spinoza, the 
job of the state is to organize the passions of the multitude through the creation of 
institutions that align the passions of the individuals with the interests of the state. 
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The best state organizes the passions of the multitude so that the power of the 
multitude is increased, with this increased power accruing to the state. 
To the contemporary ear the phrase ‘power of the state’ and the aims to ‘increase 
the power of the state’ in order to make the state ‘more absolute’ may have a chilling 
ring. However, Spinoza, writing at the birth of the modern state, and as one of its first 
theorists, believed that the state was the best hope for individual empowerment and 
freedom. Spinoza argues that outside the state, or in a poorly organized or ‘bad’ state, 
organized through fear, there could be little hope for human freedom. By ‘freedom’, 
Spinoza did not mean liberty or the absence of obstacles, as in Hobbes’ sense,12 but 
rather the positive freedom to increase one’s power and knowledge of the natural 
world without limit.
13
 Such ‘empowerment’ can only be achieved collectively, within 
an organized sovereign state.
14
 Fear and exclusion diminish the power of the state, 
and thus, in Spinoza’s view, the possibility for human empowerment and freedom.  15  
The power of Spinoza’s state is ‘enabling’ power.16 Spinoza’s state, we will see, can 
only become more powerful by increasing the power of its citizens.
17
 
Spinoza argued that the best states are strong democracies. For Spinoza, the 
problem of politics consisted in finding out how to make a state more powerful in a 
way that also made it freer. Given the dearth of democracies in early modern Europe, 
the idea of a free or democratic state that was stable seemed oxymoronic, and was 
indeed a fringe view. Mainstream political theory and practice insisted that one ‘head’ 
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or monarch was necessary for a state to be stable. In fact, in United Provinces, 
Spinoza’s own state, the idea of a headless republic threw political theorists and 
politicians into a crisis. At one point, in order to have a head for their state they 
invited Queen Elizabeth of England to rule the Provinces.
18
 However, Spinoza 
designed his alternative theory of political power to offer a non-monarchical solution 
to the problem of creating strong and free states. In his political works he does so by 
undermining monarchical theories of power. He argues that no matter how strong and 
fearsome one’s leader, a monarch is only as strong as the multitude of subjects and 
citizens he or she is able to command. Thus, for Spinoza, the power of the state is not 
vested in the monarch, but rather is a function of the power of the subjects and 
citizens. In technical terms, this is expressed as follows: Spinoza understands the 
power of the state as a function of the power of the multitude.
19
   
Spinoza’s multitude, in contemporary Spinoza studies has come to mean all sorts 
of things, but for Spinoza, a multitude is just a group of diverse individuals living in a 
particular territory – it is best understood as an aggregate of diverse individuals, who 
may not share a religion, history, culture or ethnicity.
20
  The power of the multitude, 
in turn, is a function of the power of the individuals in the multitude, and their degree 
of organization and agreement.  In very general terms, on Spinoza’s view, a multitude 
is strong if it is made up of well-coordinated individuals who have relatively 
reasonable laws and customs. A multitude is weak, if the individuals within it are 
completely disorganized and are each following their own passions – something along 
the lines of Hobbes’ state of nature.  
 
II. Individual Power 
 
Following Hobbes, Spinoza argues that in order to understand the power of the whole, 
the state, we need to understand the power of its parts – the individuals within the 
state and their interactions. Both Spinoza and Hobbes focused on the emotions of 
individuals (or affects, in Spinozan terminology) as their primary mode of interaction. 
In the following section, I will set out Spinoza’s conception of individual power, and 
then connect this to the theory of collective power, set out above.  
For Spinoza, each individual has an irreducible index of power, or conatus, 
which is derived from God, and which can be increased through the proper 
organization of the affects and the imagination.
21
 The affects, or passions, are, for 
Spinoza, the expression of the force of the natural world on individuals. External 
forces impinge upon us, creating affections in us. For Spinoza, humans are part of 
nature; their knowledge of themselves and the objects that surround them in the world 
comes through their being affected by these objects. Spinoza defines the affects as 
follows: “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of 
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acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas 
of these affections.”22 The individual experiences increases or decreases in power as 
affects: as joy or sadness or guilt or anger.
23
 
In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that ‘affects’ can be both active and passive. The 
active affects, like joy, express an increase our power. Joy is the expression of an 
increase in our power of thinking and acting. With increased power to act and think, 
we are better able to understand the world around us and ourselves. The more we 
understand the world, and what is genuinely beneficial to us, the more likely we are to 
make decisions that increase our power. Thus, this increased power prepares us to 
increase our power further. This increase means the individuals can resist the negative 
or passive affects that would otherwise decrease their power. Joy, thus, acts as a kind 
of shield against the bad or passive affects.  
The passive affects, like sadness and fear, express a decrease in our power.
 24
 
Spinoza understood that when humans are fearful, sad and angry, although they are 
weak, they are dangerous to themselves and others. When humans are weakened by 
sadness and fear, they tend to latch on to anything that seems like it might palliate 
their temporary sadness. They believe any superstition and they may make unwise 
alliances with any individual or group which seems to offer them relief or hope of a 
better state to come. When at one’s weakest point, we have little energy to investigate 
the causes of our unhappiness. Those things that offer temporary relief from our pain 
may not always be the best things for us. Individuals increase their power through 
increasing their active affects, like joy. Individuals become most powerful when they 
understand and act by following reason; however, Spinoza does not expect the mass 
of individuals to ever follow reason, or to understand what is best for them. Spinoza 
writes,  
 
Now, if men were so constituted by nature as to desire nothing but what is 
prescribed by true reason, society would stand in no need of any laws. […]. But 
human nature is far differently constituted. All men do indeed seek their own 
advantage, but by no means from the dictates of sound reason.25 
 
For Spinoza, human beings seek their advantage, but are often mistaken about what is 
truly good for them.
26
  Spinoza's solution, both to help individuals seek what is 
actually best for them, and also to create a state which would be powerful enough to 
protect and support these individuals, is to organize the state in such a way that the 
multitude would identify with the state.
27
 From this initial identification, the state can 
                                                          
22
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23
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24
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AFFECTIVE DISORDERS OF THE STATE 103 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
encourage individuals to act in accordance with its laws. However, the imaginative 
identification is prior to and ensures that individuals follow the law. Wise legislators, 
Spinoza argues, do not count on citizens to be reasonable. Instead, they create a 
variety of other mechanisms to encourage individuals to identify with the state and to 
follow its laws, following the laws of the state as if they were following their own 
interests.
28
  To ensure that individuals in the multitude identify their interests with 
those of the state, their affects and imaginative conceptions of the world must be 
coordinated. What is achieved in this coordination is not just obedient citizens, but 
empowered citizens; individuals whose power can accrue to the state. In the next 
section, I will outline Spinoza’s theory of individual power to show how, for Spinoza, 
individual power is enhanced through progressive and inclusive democratic states. 
 
III. The Spinozan Individual 
 
Each individual human, for Spinoza, has a certain striving or power, which he called, 
‘conatus’. Spinoza borrows the term ‘conatus’ from Hobbes; however, his conception 
of conatus differs from Hobbes’ in several important ways. Hobbes understands 
individual humans as characterized by appetites and passions. They are motivated by 
fear and desire, which culminate in the will, which Hobbes defines as ‘the last 
appetite before action.’29 In other words, passions and desire culminate in individual 
action. In Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature, these passionate beings are 
motivated by fear and desire to preserve themselves. Each fears the intrusion of the 
other. Each has a right to any and everything that could preserve them, yet because of 
their weakness and fear of others they are unable to obtain or hold onto these things 
for long.
30
  
Hobbes’ state of nature is chaotic, and lacks the rules and coordinating forces 
needed even to assure the shared use of language.
31
 Without shared conventions or 
norms working together would be a challenge for these individuals. The only sure 
way to coordinate individual actions and desires, Hobbes writes, is through the 
creation of a sovereign who will ensure the mutual assistance pact that the individuals 
make among one another. In Hobbes’ contract scenario, the free and equal individuals 
of the state of nature agree among themselves to give up their power, judgment and 
will to a sovereign, which they create, and whose power can be understood as the 
summed power of each individual.  
Spinoza takes up this Hobbesian picture of the political individual, agreeing with 
Hobbes that this individual is moved by its passions and by its conatus, or desire for 
self-preservation. Spinoza, however, redefines conatus as the power or striving of an 
                                                          
28
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 4, 427; An example of a strategy is  
given in the Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 17, 538-539.  
29
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30
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individual.
32
 Spinoza adds to this model of the individual an index of power, which 
can decrease or increase. The lower limit on this power is the minimum amount of 
power an individual needs to stay alive, and the upper limit or maximum, Spinoza 
leads us to believe, is unknown; given our ignorance of the capabilities of the human 
being understood as part of Nature.
33
  
An individual’s conatus is affected by the individual’s appetites, but is also 
shaped by the individual’s imaginative view of themselves and the world, insofar as 
the world is that which increases the power of the body. An individual’s conatus 
consists of three elements:  
 
i. Appetite or desire 
ii. Image of oneself 
iii. How one imagines those things which increase the power of the body34 
 
All three of these contribute to the individual’s conception of itself and the world 
(those things which increase its power). This imaginative conception of oneself and 
the world can be more or less accurate, or, in Spinoza's vocabulary 'adequate'. We can 
be wrong in a variety of ways about who we are, what is best for us, what forces 
affect us, and what things increase our power.  
“Adequate” is a technical term for Spinoza. The more ‘adequate’ or reliable one’s 
conceptions of the world, the better one understands the world. Adequate is a scalar 
notion: the adequacy of one’s understanding of the world is a matter of degree. We 
can develop more adequate understandings of the world and ourselves. We begin with 
inadequate imaginative conceptions of the world, then as we increase our experience 
and come to understand ourselves and the physical nature of reality, our imaginative 
views become more adequate. The better or more accurate this imaginative picture, 
the more our power is increased; the more confused the picture, the weaker we are, 
and the less likely we are to make choices which will increase our power or preserve 
us in the best way possible.  
If, for example, we are hiking and hungry and think that what are in fact poison 
berries might be a tasty treat that we then eat, we are likely to decrease our power by 
becoming sick. If we had prepared snacks in advance we could have avoided this 
consequence. Better still, we could have researched edible flora before our venture. 
That is to say, the more we understand our physical environment and ourselves as 
physical beings, even in this very mundane hiking example, we will prepare for this 
very predictable mid-hike peckishness.  
When we are ignorant of ourselves as physical beings and ignorant of the natural 
world in which we live, we are bound to make poor choices. If we are ignorant of the 
natural world and ourselves as bound by this physical world, we might also develop 
unrealistic goals, which can then lead to poor choices. If we lack an adequate 
                                                          
32
Spinoza, Ethics, E3P6, 283; E3P7, 283.  
33
Spinoza, Ethics, E3P2, 279-280; E3P2S, 280-282.  
34
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understanding of our bodies and the nature of the physical world, for example, we 
may think that we can use our arms to fly. If we try to flap our arms and fly, we are 
likely to be disappointed. These are somewhat ridiculous examples, but they show the 
essence of Spinoza’s view: the better we understand the natural world, and ourselves 
as natural creatures, the better decisions we can make, the better goals we can develop, 
and the better we can preserve ourselves.  
We can be wrong about what we desire, about who and what we are, and we can 
be wrong about the world and what is good and bad for us. To the extent that we are 
‘wrong’, that is, that our ideas or imaginative conceptions are inadequate, our actions 
based on these ideas cannot help but be non-optimal. As we come to investigate the 
natural world and ourselves as part of the natural world, we have the chance to 
increase our power, to make better decisions, and to act in a way that is actually best 
for us.  
Spinoza’s revised picture of the individual changes his view of the state of nature 
and of the method by which individuals leave the state of nature for political society.  
In the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP), Spinoza first presents a Hobbesian 
picture of the contract scenario, where individuals join together and contract to 
transfer their power to a sovereign, which they agree to obey. In the following section 
of the TTP, Chapter 17, Spinoza begins to worry about the feasibility of this transfer. 
Although Hobbes’ notion of a collective agreement among the individuals in the 
multitude to transfer of power and authority to the sovereign appears valid, Spinoza is 
not convinced that such an ‘authorization’ or ‘transfer’ is effective. Spinoza doubts 
that agreements of this kind could be counted on in the future to stabilize this 
previously disordered multitude for once and for all.
35
 
Spinoza argues that, in reality, no individual could give up either all his or her 
power or all his or her judgment to another.
36
 No one can give up all his or her power 
to the sovereign; each always retains that portion of it that they require for living. This 
retained power may not seem like much, since these individuals are small and 
relatively weak. However, whatever power they retain is power that they withhold 
from the sovereign and which the sovereign may later fear. For Spinoza, this power 
retained by the individuals entering the civil state erased the boundary between the 
civil state and the state of nature -- it doomed the Hobbesian contract scenario. 
Spinoza writes:  
 
The picture presented in the last chapter of the overriding right of sovereign powers 
and the transference to them of the individuals natural right, though it comes quite 
close to actual practice and can increasingly be realized in reality, must 
nevertheless remain in many respects no more than theory. Nobody can so 
completely transfer to another all his right, and consequently his power, as to cease 
being a human being, nor will there ever be a sovereign power that can do all it 
pleases. […] It must therefore be granted that the individual reserves to himself a 
                                                          
35
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 16, 528-530.  
36
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 5, 438.  
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considerable part of his right, which therefore depends on nobody’s decision but his 
own.37  
       
The individual, indeed, all the individuals in the multitude retain their power, which 
they can use against or for the sovereign, even after they have contracted to enter the 
civil state. Thus, the sovereign cannot ensure that all of its orders are obeyed. To 
ensure obedience, the sovereign must win over the multitude's obedience for each 
decision. To ensure state's power, the sovereign must obtain cooperation. The fate of 
the state thus remains in the hands of the multitude of individuals, whose power, 
although small, is their own. As long as the sovereign fails to obtain this effective 
power, sovereignty is lost, the contract is broken, and the 'state of nature' returns.
38
 
While Hobbes argues that the moment of transfer of legal sovereignty from the 
multitude to the sovereign solved the problem of the state of nature and created a 
powerful civil state, Spinoza disagreed. Spinoza writes that, "The sovereign powers 
possess the right of commanding whatever they will only for so long as they do in fact 
hold supreme power."
39
 Effective power,  the ability to command the actions of the 
multitude, is the mark of sovereignty.
40
 For Spinoza, the problem of politics and the 
problem of the state became the problem of organizing the passions of the multitude 
at every moment. Instead of transferring sovereignty once and for all, the multitude 
retains their power. Thus, for Spinoza, the power of the sovereign state is a function 
of the power of the multitude, which can use their power for or against the state. 
Individuals continue to follow their own appetites and views of the world. If the state 
does not coordinate these views, and encourage 'reasonable' and non-violent, non-
egoistic appetites, then the chaos of the state of nature will return and is in fact a 
constant possibility. The aim of politics changes for Spinoza: 
 
To guard against all these dangers, to organize a state in such a way as leaves no 
place for wrongdoing, or better still to frame such a constitution that every man, 
whatever be his character will set public good over private advantage, this is the 
task, this the toil.41 
 
For Spinoza, right is coextensive with power and desire. To the extent these weak 
individuals retain any amount of power; they always retain some right against the 
sovereign.  
Where this leads is not to Spinoza articulating a right to resistance. He, like 
Hobbes, is interested in creating a strong civil state. Rather, this model changes the 
problem of government. We cannot, as Hobbes does, understand the power of the 
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sovereign as obtaining the effective power of the contracting individuals. Human 
individuals cannot, Spinoza argues, transfer their power and will to the sovereign with 
a mere promise. Individuals retain some of their power, and the problem of 
government becomes how to manage this power of the multitude, how to create 
institutions which will wrangle the power of the individuals in the multitude to be 
used for the ends of the state.
42
  
Entering the civil state, for Spinoza, means that individuals coordinate their 
behavior and their ends in some sense. They can do this by aligning their affects 
through coordinating their ‘imaginative’ views of the world and themselves, and 
through the social or the community.
43
  On a Spinozan view, how one imagines 
oneself and those things that increase the power of the body shapes one’s picture of 
the world. Our ‘picture’ of the world is just a revisable set of images which one uses 
to get around in the world.  
We develop this imaginative view through interaction with other things, 
especially other individuals like us. We are not isolated, and there is no real state of 
nature. Positing such a state, where individuals’ desires seem to come from nowhere 
leads us in fact to fundamentally misunderstand how our desires and imaginative 
views of the world and ourselves are caused.  We increase our power in the social 
world, through increasing those interactions with others that increase our esteem. We 
can increase our power by bringing about what we imagine others desire and what we 
ourselves desire, by strengthening our self-conception and joining with others. 
Spinoza explains that one’s conatus is shaped socially. One’s image of oneself is a 
product of interaction with others. The desires of the self move outward toward others. 
If they are like us (in some respect), we take up their desires as desirable. Spinoza’s 
social theory builds from this reciprocal interaction between the images, emotions and 
desires of those in a community. These individuals in the state of nature are 
understood as having idiosyncratic pictures of the world. However, in joining together 
for common purpose, their pictures begin to merge – they begin to see the world and 
themselves differently because of reciprocal interactions with others. 
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IV. Social and Political Life 
 
Organizing political society requires some way of unifying the effects of the 
individuals in the multitude. Spinoza argues that we can organize the multitude 
through shared religion, norms, common symbols and laws that motivate individuals’ 
affects. In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza gives the example of Moses, 
who introduced a religion as a way to organize the effects of the multitude. Having 
just emerged from slavery, the Hebrew people were weak, fearful, and unused to 
organizing their own lives.
44
 Rather than institute the renewed slavery of despotism, 
Spinoza writes, Moses, “made laws and ordained them for the people, taking greatest 
care that they should be obeyed willingly and not through fear…Moses therefore 
introduced a religion, so that people might do their duty from devotion rather than 
fear. Further, he bound them over by benefits and prophesied many advantages in the 
future.”45  
The problem of the state is transformed in Spinoza into a problem of how to 
unify the individuals in a state through the organizing of the affects and the agreement 
of the imagination.   A 'collective' or shared imaginative view of the world can be 
created through unifying the effects of the multitude. This does not necessarily mean 
that the members of a society need believe in imaginative beings or have shared 
fantasies in the everyday sense of 'imaginative'. Rather, for Spinoza, imaginative 
views, as discussed above are the 'less than adequate' views one might have about the 
world. Thus, all non-adequate views of the world will be 'imaginative' views in 
Spinoza's terminology. By using the term 'imaginary' to describe these collective 
views of the world, Spinoza means to include the 'affective' dimension of non-
adequate views of reality. 
Creating a shared imaginary is a political tool to coordinate the effects of the 
multitude so that the state can use the power of the multitude for common ends.  
Just as Spinoza’s human individual has an index of power related to that 
individual’s ability to organize his or her affects and through the individual’s self-
conception and understanding of what increases their power (conatus), so too the state 
has a similar index of power. The state, for Spinoza, is a complex individual of a 
higher order than the human individual, but with similar problems of organization.
46
 
Just as the human body is complex and pulled in different directions by the forces 
acting upon it, so too the state is made up of parts -- human individuals -- who are 
themselves pulled in different directions by external and internal forces. To unify the 
state, to make it into an individual, the motions or emotions of its parts must be 
organized or coordinated. Now, just as for the individual, one cannot make a leap 
directly to reason. Power must be increased through the affects. So most states begin 
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as communities that are organized affectively. Through common love or fear, 
individuals join together for common purpose and to increase their power.
47
  
Just as an individual can increase their power through active affects, so too states 
can become more powerful. States can develop.
48
 While they may begin as social 
collectives bound by shared religion, passion, or customs, they can come to critique 
and reform these practices and develop laws based on reason. Thus, the state can 
follow the path of empowerment just as individuals can, by: 1) organizing its affects 
and coordinating the individuals within it, and 2) by making those affects active, 
through understanding them and through focusing on the active affects, which 
increase its power, 3) the state can come to organize itself maximally well, that is, 
according to reason. Since Aristotle, political philosophers have understood ‘the state’ 
or ‘ the political’ as a space where social practices and customs can be questioned and 
reformed. Spinoza continues this tradition. The most powerful, or best state is the one 
that has laws and institutions based on reason and thus, that yield the ‘best’ for those 
within the state.  
 
V. Power and Inclusion 
 
How can one mobilize the power of the individuals for the power of the state? We 
cannot, Spinoza argues, merely sum the power of the individuals for the power of the 
state, or assume their power through a verbal transfer or agreement. Such agreements 
are only as strong as the individuals’ continuing motivation to uphold them. Humans 
are moved by their individual appetites, which are internally complex.
49
 This 
complexity leads humans to be inconsistent and therefore unreliable.
50
 Agreement is 
not so simply achieved, as Spinoza believed the contract theorists, even Hobbes, were 
guilty of presuming. Hobbes’ view suggests that by transferring their right, 
individuals are then obliged to use their power in the service of the state. Spinoza 
insists that right and power are coextensive, and that the judgment of an individual 
cannot be guaranteed in advance.
51
 If one transfers their right in advance, their power 
had better be used at the same time. There is little guarantee that this same individual 
will use his or her power when you really need it.  
Contracts, for Spinoza, are made to be broken, and broken they will be. Unless of 
course, you set up a series of institutions which have affective incentives that can 
guarantee that the individual would be more likely to come through in the end. If you 
want to compel people’s power to be used for the end of the state, you need to 
understand how individual power can be compelled, and for this, we return to 
Spinoza’s affective-imaginative understanding of individuals, which I outlined above.  
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For Spinoza, the problem of the political state is one of managing the effects of 
those within its boundaries, and those outside its boundaries who are potential 
enemies. The interpretation of Spinoza’s ethical and political theory that I have 
presented provides us with what we can think of as a principle of inclusion.  
In its negative aspect, the principle suggests that when we have social or political 
problems (unrest, excessive crime, and lack of respect for the law) it is most likely 
because of those we have excluded. Something in the policy of the state has created a 
class of what Spinoza terms ‘enemies of the state,’ that is, those who have nothing to 
hope or fear from the state.
52
 These enemies include those who have turned against 
the state due to indignation.
53
  
According to Spinoza, we need to worry about the excluded, the enemies of the 
state, and we need to do so in two ways. First, we have to worry about their negative 
passions and whether or not they could cause harm to the state. Second, from the 
standpoint of the best state, we need to worry about the opportunity costs of not 
including them in the state; that is, we need to account for the power we waste by not 
including individuals whose increased power could benefit the state.  
In its positive aspect, Spinoza’s inclusion principle provides us with the 
normative model of the ‘best’ state, which in Spinoza’s terms is also the most 
absolute state, the strongest and most effective state. An absolute state is one that is 
participatory and inclusive and one in which the power of those within it is 
maximized. This model provides us with a conception of what the state would be if all 
citizens were included and active participants in the state, with their affects 
maximally active. Because the power of the state is a function of the power of the 
multitude that makes it up, the state must somehow care for or care about the power 
of individuals. Many states have not understood this properly, and have believed that 
they needed to limit the power of the people, not recognizing that the power of 
individuals, if maximized, if increased, could yield a more powerful state.  
Strong states require that the multitude of subjects and rulers identify their ‘best’ 
with the ‘best’ for the state, so that they will use their power to support it. Spinoza 
writes that democracy is the most absolute form of state.
54
 In the democratic state, 
maximally inclusive participation in governing bodies makes possible communication 
among the entire multitude, creating the conditions for maximal individual and state 
empowerment.  
 
VI. The Power of Fear 
 
Hobbes and Spinoza disagree on the power of fear.  For Hobbes, as long as the 
sovereign is powerful enough to overawe the multitude, to make them fear the power 
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and punishment for breaking the law, the state would be stable. The stability of such a 
state was built on the assurance that inside each individual subject was an internal 
scale. If the sovereign’s power were fearsome enough, the scale would be tipped in 
favor of following the sovereign’s command over any other appetite the individual 
may have to do otherwise.   
Spinoza doubted the power of fear. Fear, he thought, was an unreliable affect. For 
Hobbes, fear and joy may lead to different outcomes, but they are just varieties of 
perturbations, leading to different possible outcomes. The outcomes may differ in 
their usefulness, but the affects were just means to those ends, and neither good nor 
bad, neither empowering nor enervating in themselves. If anything, Hobbes believed 
fear was the more reliable affect for obtaining the loyalty of the subjects, since 
humans were fickle, and their love was less easy to retain. However, for Spinoza, 
fearful affects seemed to decrease the individual’s power, to make them less able to 
make good decisions and more likely to believe and to follow any path, however 
misguided or contrary to their own interests. In the Theological-Political Treatise, 
Spinoza writes, “Fear engenders, preserves, and fosters superstition.” Those 
possessed by fear, he argues, “are swayed this way or that by the slightest 
impulse…Even the most trivial of causes are enough to raise their hopes or dash them 
to the ground.”55   
In the Ethics, Spinoza incorporates this insight into his mature theory of the 
affects. He proposes in Book 3 of the Ethics that there are two types of affects: the 
passive affects, like fear and sadness, and the active affects like joy. The former 
decrease our power, while the latter increase it.
56
 Whatever produces joyful affects 
increases the power of the body, and therefore the power of the mind. Whatever 
produces sad or fearful affects decreases the power of the body to act and to think. 
Thus, in the Ethics, Spinoza develops his earlier insights about the tendency of some 
affects to increase the power of an individual, and others to decrease one’s power into 
a fully embodied conception of the affects, derived from his study of Hobbes. Spinoza 
argues, following Hobbes, that even ideas and imaginations are embodied. All 
knowledge comes through the body, through its affections.
57
 These affections are felt 
as emotions, and mark some things as ‘good’ and others as ‘bad’ depending on how 
they affect us.    
Spinoza’s insight about the disempowering nature of fear led him to critique 
Hobbes’s conception of the foundation of the political state. Fear alone is not enough 
to guarantee that the subjects would follow the sovereign’s command, since fear of 
the sovereign could lead them to just about any action. Fear, for Spinoza, decreases 
human power of action and judgment, leading individuals to unpredictable courses of 
action. Fear could never be the foundation of a stable political state. In an autocratic 
state such as Hobbes proposes in the Leviathan, those subjects overawed by fear of 
the sovereign may obey the law for some time; however, their fear could also lead 
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them to rash actions against the sovereign, the object of their fear. Fear overcomes 
reason.
58
 Even the slightest hope of overthrowing the sovereign, however unlikely its 
success, might be enough to entice these weakened subjects to revolt. The sovereign 
in such a state would be like a cowboy wrangling a herd of scared steer. In such a 
fearful state, the animals are as likely to stampede or scatter as anything else. 
For Spinoza, founding a state on fear was unreliable for another reason. Fear not 
only leads individuals to make poor decisions, but individuals who are constantly 
fearful are weak, since fear decreases individual power. Since fear undermines power, 
even if a sovereign were able to keep the multitude in perpetual fear, these subjects 
could never be particularly useful to the sovereign, since they would be weak, their 
natural power undermined by fear. A powerful state needs powerful citizens, 
individuals who can work together to attain their collective ends. Those possessed by 
fear are fickle, superstitious and weak. A commonwealth made up of such beings 
would be similarly weak. Fear, thus, for Spinoza is a bad motivator of people and a 
force that disempowers the multitude. A powerful state can never emerge from a herd 
of scared animals.  
Creating a strong state requires developing institutions that increase the power of 
individuals in the multitude while leading them to develop collective ends. 
Democracy is the only variety of commonwealth that could increase the power of the 
citizens while increasing its own power, and so, Spinoza writes that democracy is the 
most powerful and best kind of dominion. 
 
VII. The Best State 
 
For Spinoza, the best state is not one in which people are forced to do their duty out 
of fear, or one in which peace is achieved at the cost of freedom. Of the state, Spinoza 
writes: 
 
Its ultimate purpose is not to exercise dominion nor to restrain men by fear and 
deprive them of independence…Thus, the purpose of the state is in reality, 
freedom.59 
 
For Spinoza, without freedom, individuals cannot begin to understand themselves and 
maximize their power. If they live in fear, a passive affect, their power will further be 
weakened. In a bad state, the individuals that make up the multitude are weak, and 
thus this kind of state is weak. Even if, for example, a despotic state was able to get 
people to follow the law and in addition joined the imaginative views of this 
disempowered multitude with a shared religion, Spinoza argues, that it could not be 
counted as the best sort of state.
60
 If, as in a despotic regime, the people are organized 
through fear, or through a religion that encourages this fear and discourages the 
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means to dispel fear, the power of the state will be less than what it could be if this 
same multitude had been empowered instead of oppressed. Despots relying on fear to 
motivate obedience will be drawing on the power of fearful and weak multitudes, 
making them less than optimally powerful. Peace, Spinoza writes, is not just the 
absence of war, and the strong commonwealth is characterized by more than just 
obedience to the law.
61
  
For Spinoza, the best state is one that allows people the maximum freedom to 
increase their power, through understanding themselves and the world. Spinoza’s 
theory of individual empowerment and how individual power accrues to the state 
suggests that maximal inclusion and political participation contribute to making the 
state more stable, and stronger than states with less participation, which exclude more 
of their citizens from active participation. Strong free democratic states were, for 
Spinoza, the ‘best’ kind of states, not just because they empowered their inhabitants, 
but also because empowered citizens make them stronger. 
In a Spinozan democracy, agreement is achieved is not through shared religious 
dogma or symbols, but through maximal inclusion and participation in a deliberative 
assembly. Because of this kind of institution, all individuals in the multitude have 
something to hope for from the state. Because of the nature of deliberation, in 
Spinoza’s view, such assemblies have the possibility of coming up with better and 
more reasonable laws than any of the individuals on their own. Through deliberation 
in large councils, human individuals come to understand that their own particular 
views may not be the only ones possible. This yields some modicum of reflection, if 
only to convince others of one’s view. Thus, for Spinoza, agreement is not guaranteed, 
but rather is the goal of the best state. The strongest agreements are based on reason. 
For agreement to be based on reason, the state must ensure the empowerment of its 
population, particularly if that state is a democracy. Spinoza’s conception of 
agreement and reason aims at human empowerment rather than exclusion and 
oppression.  
The aims of democracy, in Spinoza's view, are both epistemic and affective
62
 
through including as many individuals as possible, the decisions of a democracy are 
based on the collective knowledge of its people. Through requiring the assembly to 
come to collective decisions, democracies encourage discussion, which in Spinoza's 
view leads to both better decisions and a collective conception of oneself as part of 
the state, with stakes in the outcome of democratic decisions. Extended arguments for 
this conception of democracy are necessary, but beyond the scope of this article. For 
Spinoza, maximal inclusion yields the 'best state'; we are concerned here with 
minimizing exclusion in order to avoid the worst state -- those with numerous internal 
enemies.    
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VIII. Exclusionary Outcomes: Enemies of the State 
 
A recent report published by the Pew Center on Public Safety Performance
63
 reported 
that one in every 99.1 American adults is imprisoned, making the United States the 
‘world’s incarceration leader’64 with 2,319,258 adults in prisons and jails. For some 
groups, this percentage of adults imprisoned is even more distressing. Among African 
American adult males, one in 9 is imprisoned. Among Hispanics, one in 15 adults are 
imprisoned. Despite heavy spending on criminal prosecution and imprisonment, Pew 
researchers write, “recidivism rates remain stubbornly high.”65 Despite having a large 
percentage of the population in prison, it would appear that crime is not prevented, 
and the collective goal of public safety is not reached. In analyzing these results the 
researchers at Pew stress the importance of reconsidering mandatory minimums 
sentences and considering sentencing alternatives other than prisons. However, the 
causes of crime, what leads people to break the law, are not addressed directly.   
For Spinoza, having this percentage of its population behind bars makes the U.S. 
a ‘bad’ state. A bad state, for Spinoza, is one in which the law is not respected, which 
for Spinoza, suggests that the laws are badly implemented. A bad commonwealth, 
where all live in fear, Spinoza writes, is no better than the state of nature.
66
 Fear is a 
tool of those governments or forms of dominion that are weak and thus have reason to 
fear the power of the multitude. A bad commonwealth, in this sense, is a weak 
commonwealth. Governments that fear their own people are constantly plotting 
against them, wasting their energies and resources fighting and repressing their own 
people.
67
  They also waste the energies of their own people, who could be working for 
the goals of the state if properly channeled. The state, by designing its laws and 
customs in a certain way has caused a great percentage of its population to become 
internal enemies. Spinoza understands ‘enemies of the state’ as those who have 
nothing to hope or fear from the state. People who break the law fit this description. 
Having a large percentage of such people is worrying.  
Spinoza does not end here, just noting that enemies of the state are dangerous, 
but argues that a good state must minimize its enemies by leading through hope as 
well as fear.
68
 A good state minimizes its enemies not by locking them all up or 
killing them, but rather by offering them incentives to align themselves with the state 
rather than against it, and by understanding what affective-imaginative events have 
caused their becoming oriented against the state. Spinoza encourages us to see 
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problems of crime, violence and chaos as problems of affect and exclusion that it is 
the job of political institutions to solve and to understand.  
Factions, rulers behaving badly, and bad laws -- all of these things can undermine 
the power of the state.
69
 Factions, which form for all sorts of reasons that we can also 
understand in terms of affect and imagination, draw individuals into groups oriented 
toward their own goals and projects. They generally form because individuals have 
been excluded or at least not properly included in the state; they join together because 
of this common exclusion and the affective and imaginative (or historical) basis of 
this exclusion. Factions are groups that see themselves as in some ways opposed to 
the state. The job of the state, according to Spinoza, is first of all to try and minimize 
factions by avoiding such exclusions and by trying to create affective incentives to 
encourage individuals to follow the law willingly and to identify with the state.
70
 To 
do so, the state must understand people as imaginative and affective, and must 
understand how their affects are organized and how they see themselves and the state. 
Then, the state must understand how to include them, through imaginative and 
affectively effective institutions. By understanding the role of imagination, of identity 
and of affect in creating a multitude whose power can work for the state, we can 
perhaps begin to solve these problems with the proper affective and imaginative 
solutions.  
Rulers behave badly in two ways: when they act in a manner that disrupts the 
commonwealth and causes indignation in their personal life;
71
 more importantly, they 
undermine the power of the state through bad laws. Although a reckless tyrant with a 
notorious personal life may diminish respect for the ruler, bad laws do much more 
damage to the power and stability of a government. Bad laws, in Spinoza’s view, are 
laws that cannot be enforced through threats or enticements.
72
 One cannot, Spinoza 
argues, “make a table eat grass”, by which he means that there are some things which 
both cannot be done and thus ought not be required, just as there are some things 
which cannot be omitted, and thus ought not be prohibited. One can prohibit and 
require all one likes, that is, rulers may propose laws regulating and requiring 
whatever they wish. However, a ruler can only effectively legislate what is possible to 
enforce, and what is possible for those subject to the law to do or not to do. Spinoza 
writes, He who seeks to regulate everything by law will aggravate vices rather than 
correct them. What cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed, even if harm 
often ensues.”73 
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Bad laws, for Spinoza, are those that attempt to prohibit actions that cannot be 
prohibited, because they prohibit actions that are not in the power of (most) 
individuals to control. Since such laws punish what cannot be controlled, they ensure 
both that the laws will be flouted and unenforceable. Both of these outcomes 
undermine the power of the state, and thereby the ability of the state to encourage 
human flourishing.  
In the Political Treatise, Spinoza provides a prescient example of what he 
considers a ‘bad law’. In that work, Spinoza proposes that the vice of drunkenness 
cannot be prohibited or stopped by laws, so it is a mistake to regulate it by law. 
Prohibition in the United States and the continually failing war on drugs might 
provide examples of how such laws are 'bad' in a variety of ways. In Spinoza’s view, 
these laws seem to misunderstand human desires and express an ignorance of the 
physical control of lack thereof of involved in these vices. For Spinoza, laws that try 
to control human emotions and desires, particularly those that attempt to control what 
we might think of as addictions over which addicts have little control, are nearly as 
ridiculous as laws requiring that humans fly by flapping their arms. The better we 
understand the affective causes of human behavior, the better we can formulate our 
laws. When we fail to understand human desires and emotions, the more likely we are 
to propose and waste our resources enforcing bad laws. If humans cannot control their 
desires for drink or drugs, then they become criminals, and flout the laws of the state; 
as the laws of the state are flouted, and the number of criminals or enemies of the 
state increases, the state has to expend enormous and ultimately wasted resources on 
prosecuting and enforcing unenforceable laws. Ignorance of human nature is 
expensive and is bought at the price of stability and freedom.  
Spinoza's most extended discussion of bad laws focuses on the question of 
freedom of expression and judgment, which the governments of his time desired to 
curb.
74
 In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza argues that laws prohibiting the 
freedom to express one’s views and to philosophize are ultimately detrimental to the 
power of the state. Laws prohibiting freedom of judgment and expression are 
detrimental to the state because, Spinoza argues, they cannot be enforced. No 
individual can give up their ability to judge for themselves or to speak their opinion. 
No matter how powerful a sovereign ruler, Spinoza writes, “They will never succeed 
in preventing men from exercising their own particular judgment on any matter 
whatsoever and from being influenced accordingly by a variety of emotions.” 75  
Spinoza further argues that just as humans cannot control their judgments, so they 
cannot control their expressions of these judgments.
76
 By attempting to prevent 
individuals from judging and speaking their views, a state creates enemies and 
undermines the ‘good faith’ of its citizens. Those who disagree with the state are 
forced to pretend otherwise, and thus, a state’s best citizens are reduced to 
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‘sycophancy and treachery.’ 77  If good and thoughtful citizens speak out and are 
punished for their ideas, this will lead, in Spinoza’s view, to the ruin of the state.78 
Spinoza writes: 
 
The greater the effort to deprive them of freedom of speech, the more obstinately 
they do resist …Men in general are so constituted that their resentment is most 
aroused when beliefs which they think are true are treated as criminal…In 
consequence, they are emboldened to denounce the laws and go to all lengths to 
oppose the magistrate, considering it not a disgrace but honorable to stir up sedition 
and to resort to any outrageous action in this cause.79 
 
Laws requiring belief or prohibiting it turn all of the states’ citizens into potential 
enemies.  By prohibiting that which cannot be effectively prohibited, bad laws 
undermine the power of the state and the loyalty of its citizens. Prohibiting freedom 
of expression and judgment leads directly to dissent, faction and rebellion. Thus, in 
Spinoza’s view, such laws are ‘bad’; they are ruinous to the commonwealth and its 
citizens. Instead of prohibiting what humans cannot change, Spinoza suggests that the 
best laws are those that are determined by the people themselves. Therefore, he thinks 
democracy is the best form of government.
80
 Including the multitude in the decision 
making process in the form of a democratic states is the best way to achieve peace 
and power. Democracy, the most inclusive form of state, is Spinoza’s solution to the 
problem of ‘bad laws’, ‘factions’ and ‘rulers behaving badly’.  
 
IX. Conclusion: Affective Disorders of the State 
 
Spinoza’s understanding of power and affects both in individuals and in political 
communities allows us to reorient our thinking about some of our most pressing 
political problems. When rulers wreak havoc or parts of the citizenry disobey the law, 
the problem, for Spinoza, is not the individuals. Individual humans, rulers and 
citizens, are everywhere the same. They will always seek what appears to be good for 
them, whether they are right or wrong. The problem is the state and its laws and 
customs. The task of the state is to organize the passions of the multitude of 
individuals within the state and its rulers to obey the law. Bad laws and customs yield 
disorder.
81
 Bad laws are ineffective at creating order and contributing to human 
flourishing; however, they are remarkably good at alienating citizens by arousing 
their indignation. Bad laws create, in other words, enemies of the state.
82
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The internal enemies of the United States, our millions of citizens jailed, return to 
our communities. And what do they find there? They are, for the most part, excluded 
from political participation, they cannot vote. They are excluded from participation in 
public life in other ways depending on the state and local ordinance. They have 
difficulty finding jobs, they cannot get student loans, and in general they continue to 
be punished long after their sentence is served.  
For those seeking harsher punishments than even these, the purpose of this article 
may be suspect. Does a Spinozan view suggest that there should be no punishment? 
Should we throw open the jails and expect a peaceful and just outcome? If so, it 
would appear this view suffers from delusional optimism and is unworkable in our 
times because of just those affective disorders it diagnoses. However, Spinoza's 
approach should be understood not as a theory of criminology, but rather a political 
theory that shines a light on the role of prisons, crime and affective disorders within 
the state. If we wish to prevent crime and other affective disorders, Spinoza suggests, 
mass exclusion, in the contemporary form of prisons, may not achieve the end we 
seek.  Imprisonment, along with other forms of political, social and economic 
exclusion creates enemies of the state. 
Enemies of the state, those who have nothing to hope or to fear from the state  – 
these are forces which the state must fear and secure itself against. Those who have 
been in prison no longer have much to fear from the state and if we send ex-convicts 
out into the world, without opportunity for living a normal life, then except under the 
rarest of situations, they will continue to worry us either through recidivism or 
through our fear. Branded as convicts they may have nothing to hope from the state; 
having already experienced prisons, they have less to fear. These 'enemies' with 
nothing to hope or fear from the state should worry us; finding ways to productively 
include them, thus offering them hope, provides a real solution to this genuine 
problem. Providing hope, on Spinoza's view, is also better than finding additional 
ways to frighten ex-convicts. As discussed above, those who are overwhelmed by fear 
are unlikely to act rationally. As an active affect, hope increases individual power. 
Hope, although it is not to be counted upon in all scenarios,
83
 is better than fear, 
which is always debilitating, in Spinoza's view.  
Our enemies do not disappear. Excluding them only increases their danger. 
Spinoza’s focus on the affective foundation of social life and his view that the 
primary problem of political philosophy is to create institutions and practices that 
organize the effects of the multitude recognizes this need not to make enemies of 
citizens, and to find ways to include those who could become our enemies.  
Criminals, of course, are just one of the many ‘enemies’ that a state creates. 
Living in an increasingly globally interconnected world with a substantial democratic 
deficit at the state and international levels, those countries with the power to create 
policies that reverberate beyond their borders regularly create external friends and 
enemies. Those excluded from political, social and economic power in other ways can 
also be considered enemies of the state. Enemies weaken the state, since all enemies, 
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however weak, still retain enough power to destabilize the state. Spinoza's critique of 
Hobbes' social contract suggests that whatever power the state cannot accrue to its 
ends remains as a constant source of potential fear. Consider our contemporary fear of 
the suicide bomber, perhaps part of a collective moment, perhaps not. A single 
individual, the suicide bomber, has inspired the building of massive borders between 
states, enormous spending on security, rolling back of centuries-cherished civil 
liberties and an extra-legal international apparatus of punishment and surveillance 
about which we all have much to fear.  
A state, and a people, in a constant condition of fear is weak, and wastes its 
power, Spinoza warns. Thus, Spinoza encourages inclusion -- not just because human 
empowerment relies on participation in communal life and the help of others, but also 
because excluding these people further makes them our enemies. Enemies weaken the 
state causing states and citizens to worry about them; wasting time and energy 
building more prisons, creating surveillance techniques, employing armies of police, 
and pursuing policies that undermine the state’s legal structure and civil liberties.  
By making citizens into criminals we lose their potential as good citizens. These 
are the opportunity costs of creating enemies. Instead of using their power for the 
good of the state, we encourage indignation and dissent. We have seen ample 
examples of criminalizing and excluding some of our best and brightest citizens in the 
recent panic over the Occupy movement. Instead of taking the mass protests across 
the globe as evidence of a powerful message from their citizens, countries like 
Canada, the United States and others have sought to criminalize protesting.
84
 By 
seeing all citizens as ‘potential enemies’ states discourage loyalty and identification 
with the state, thereby diminishing the potential power of the state. In this way, 
Spinoza alerts us to the opportunity costs of a non-participatory state and policies that 
create such enemies of the state. 
Those we exclude diminish our power by making us weak and suspicious. 
Excluding them robs us of the power they could supply as productive fellow citizens. 
Spinoza teaches us that we cannot transfer the power of the multitude to the state in 
one fell swoop or through a contract. Rather, the power of the multitude must be 
cultivated and organized. This power must be oriented so that the power of the 
multitude can be used for the strengthening of the state, which in turn empowers 
individuals. In this way, Spinoza shows us how political stability and human 
empowerment are inextricably linked, and how the disempowerment of some affects 
the power of all.  
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